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I.

INTRODUCTION

tions.2 Since 1890, when a New York court first

recognized a legal right to privacy,3 privacy law
The rise of American privacy law over the years
reflects the profound importance of this fundamental value in modern society.' The notion of
citizens living under surveillance or governmental
interference with personal decisions and behavior
runs counter to democratic principles and tradi-

has grown vast and complex. Although privacy law
developed slowly during the 20th century, 4 by the
late 1970s, the right to privacy stretched broadly
6
5
across the landscapes of tort law, statutory law

* The author (Ph.D., University of Florida; M.A., University of Florida; B.A., Loyola University, Chicago) is an assistant professor of communications in the College of Communications at The Pennsylvania State University and a Senior
Fellow of The Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment.
1 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (A
person who speaks on the phone is "surely entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a .. .freedom not to
speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as
freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.") (citing Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255
(N.Y. 1968)). See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (dictum)
(defining the constitutional right of privacy as "the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men").

FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE

202 (1967).
In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that one's speech is being
monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such
activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the
willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.
Id.
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

2

Individual rights to "zones of privacy" have origins in

the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965). Lawrence H. Tribe, leading constitutional law
scholar, observed that "the [F]ourth [A]mendment, more
than any other explicit constitutional provision reflects the
existence of [an individual's right to privacy]." LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1390 (1988) [hereinafter TRIBE]. The language of the Fourth Amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

3 W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 850 n.10 (1984) [hereinafter KEETON] (citing

Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890 (unreported)). In this
case, the court responded to a call for privacy law in an 1890
Harvard Law Review article written by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). This article is discussed
in infra, Part II. In Manola, an actress sued a man who had
photographed her while she was on stage, clad in tights, scandalous attire in those times. A New York judge enjoined the
respondent from publishing the photo. KEETON, supra at 850
n.10.
4 See Don R. Pember, The Burgeoning Scope of "Access Privacy" and the Portentfor a Free Press, 64 IOWA L. REv. 1155, 1156
(1979) [hereinafter Pember].
5 Tortious claims for invasion of privacy have been recognized in state statutes and in the common law and have given
rise to four civil causes of action: intrusion, appropriation,
publicity about private information and false light. See KxETON, supra note 3, at 849-68.
6
In 1903, New York became the first state to legislate a
right to privacy when it enacted a statute that prohibited the
exploitation of an individual for commercial purposes. There
are numerous examples of federal privacy statutes. See, e.g.,
the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §2721
(2000) (restricting the sale of information compiled by state
departments of motor vehicles to marketing and advertising
companies); the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18
U.S.C. §2710 (2000) (restricting disclosure by video-service
providers of individual consumer uses and customers' per-
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and constitutional law. 7 Constitutional privacy restricts governmental intrusions into people's
lives,8 while statutory9 and tortious' ° privacy laws
help shield individuals from incursions by the private sector.
Over the past generation, the term "privacy"
has captured the American imagination as never
before. Unprecedented advances in information
technology make it possible for strangers to pry
electronically into our lives and for corporations
and the government to accumulate vast stores of

personal information about us in databases."
Fear of disclosures of this kind of information,
heightened by media reports about computer
hacking and identity theft, have enhanced the acceptability of permitting the government and the
courts to control the flow of information about
citizens of the United States.' 2 Indeed, the 107th
Congress considered at least forty privacy bills,
ranging from spyware control and telemarketing
practices, to student privacy and video-voyeurism
protection. '-"

sonally identifiable information); the Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. §552a (2000) (restricting the misuse of personal data
compiled by the federal government); the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") of 1966, 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000) (permitting federal executive branch agencies to deny FOIA requests
for records based on specific privacy exemptions found in
the Act). See also L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting
Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (holding that a California
statute, which closes access to police records, does not violate
the First Amendment when the request was by companies
that sought to use the information for commercial purposes).
7 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding that state and federal wiretap statutes may not bar news
media disclosures of a conversation between public officials
that was illegally taped by a third party); Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603 (1999) (holding that law enforcement agencies violate an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy rights when
officers permit news media representatives to accompany officers into a home during execution of an arrest warrant);
Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999) (holding that law enforcement officers or personnel violate an individual's
Fourth Amendment privacy rights when they permit news
media representatives to accompany officers onto private
property during execution of a search warrant); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of
a New York statute that required physicians to report to the
state identifying information of individuals prescribed certain drugs that had a potential for abuse); Nixon v. Adm'r of
Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal law that required former President Nixon to
turn over his personal papers and other materials, such as
tapes, to federal archivists for review to determine if they
should be made public); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(holding that the Constitution does not permit the government to prohibit a woman from terminating her pregnancy
before the fetus is viable); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (holding that the "mere private possession of obscene
matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime"); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down as unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that prohibited the use and
distribution of contraceptives).
8 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
9 See infra note 6.
10 See, e.g., Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 978
P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff can sue a news
program for intrusion for hidden camera taping inside a
psychic telemarketing business under news media investigation); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)

(holding that an auto accident victim can bring a claim for
intrusion against a television program that filmed her rescue
without her consent).
11 See William Glanz, Online Privacy Concerns Spur Bills,
THE WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at B9.
12 James T. O'Reilly, author of the leading

practice guide
on the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, observed that to oppose efforts to "protect" or "enforce" privacy
rights is tantamount to being against "apple pie and motherhood."JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE:
PROCEDURES, FORMS, AND THE LAw §20.01, 20-2 (1999).
13
A few examples of the bills considered include the Privacy Commission Act, H.R. 583, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to establish the Commission for the Comprehensive Study of Privacy Protection"); the Confidential Information Privacy Act,
H.R. 2136, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to protect the confidentiality of [personal] information acquired from the public for
statistical purposes"); the Student Privacy Protection Act, S.
290, 107th Cong. (2001) (to provide for parental approval in
the collection of information gathered on students); the
Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act, S. 197, 107th
Cong. (2001) ("to provide for the disclosure of the collection
of information through computer software"); the Location
Privacy Protection Act of 2001, S. 1164, 107th Cong. (2001)
("to provide for the enhanced protection of the privacy of
location information of users of location-based services and
applications"); the Telemarketing Intrusive Practices Act of
2001, S. 1881, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to require the Federal
Trade Commission to establish a list of consumers who request not to receive telephone [solicitations]"). Of the privacy bills considered in Congress, more than a dozen specifically concerned online privacy. See, e.g., Social Security Online Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 91, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to
regulate the use by interactive [online] computer services of
Social Security account numbers and related personally identifiable information"); the Electronic Privacy Protection Act,
H.R. 112, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to prohibit the making, importation, exportation, distribution, sale, offer for sale, installation, or use of an information collection device without
proper labeling or notice and consent"); the Can Spam Act,
S. 630, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to prohibit senders of unsolicited commercial electronic mail from disguising the source
of their messages"); the Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201,
107th Cong. (2002) ("to provide for safeguards to protect the
online privacy of persons who use the Internet"). See also
EPIC BILL TRACK, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
bill track.html (last visited June 30, 2002); Christine Janssen,
Will the Cookie Crumble? Personal Information on the Internet
(Mar. 5, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the
2002 Annual Convention of the Western States Communication Association).
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The difficulty is that as the ambit of privacy law
expands, the amount of information available to
the public diminishes, thus blocking access to potentially valuable information that the electorate
may need to make informed decisions about selfrule. Striking an appropriate balance between an
individual's need for privacy and society's need
for information is necessary to preserve the accountability principle of democracy. 1 4 As privacy
pioneer Alan F. Westin observed in his seminal
1967 work, Privacy and Freedom, democracies must

"set a balance between government's organizational needs for preparatory and institutional privacy and the need of the press, interest groups,
and other governmental agencies for the knowledge of government operations required to keep
15
government conduct responsible."'
The purpose of this article is to examine how
the rise of constitutional privacy is affecting press
and public access to information under the government's control. Part II outlines the development of constitutionally protected personal and
behavioral privacy. 1 6 In addition, Part II discusses
how the Supreme Court has applied this form of
constitutional privacy to restrict certain longtime
newsgathering practices when balanced against
the public's legitimate interest in the information. 1 7 Part III examines the impact of information privacy on public access to government
records. This section analyzes the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision that made information
privacy grounds to change an open-records law
enacted by the Ohio legislature.' 8 Part IV discusses the latest development in information privacy, a 2001 Supreme Court decision that recognized for the first time a constitutional interest in
private facts in a press context.' 9 Part V offers examples of current statutory and regulatory trends
that illustrate recent official actions taken to
strengthen privacy law and also reflects an increasing willingness to trade transparent governance
F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 25 (1967).
Id.
16 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
17 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977); Nixon v. Adm'r
of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977).
18 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1069-70
(6th Cir. 1998).
19 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
20
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREDOM OF Ex14
15

ALAN

for enhanced privacy protection. Part VI concludes that a special problem arises when constitutional privacy is raised to block access to governmental operations or records. Constitutional privacy trumps the federal or state laws that may allow access to information, thereby circumventing
the benefit of judicial balancing that would consider whether the democratic value of access (a
public right to know for the purposes of self-rule
and to ensure accountability) outweighs the individual value in privacy (one's right to control information about oneself).
II.

THE RISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY

A.

Personal and Behavioral Privacy Interests

Constitutional scholar Thomas I. Emerson has
expressed a modern and widely accepted meaning of the right of privacy:
[P]rivacy [law] attempts to draw a line between the in-

dividual and the collective, between self and society. It
seeks to assure the individual a zone in which to be an
individual, not a member of the community. In that
zone he can think his own thoughts, have his own
secrets, live his own
life, reveal only what he wants to
20
the outside world.

According to the Supreme Court, privacy rights
have roots that can be traced back to the Bill of
Rights and the concept of personal liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 1 A legal right
to privacy was first recognized in 189022 when a
New York court responded to Samuel D. Warren's
and Louis D. Brandeis' famed HarvardLaw Review
article, which called for privacy protection and a
"right to be let alone." 23 The two Boston law partners wrote the article after a society column in the
Boston Saturday Evening Gazette carried an item

that described a lavish breakfast party hosted by
Warren for his daughter's wedding. Warren and
Brandeis were outraged that a gossip column
PRESSION 545 (1970).
21
See generally Roe

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).

See KEETON, supra note 3, at 850 n.10.
See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1891) [hereinafter Warren &
22

23

Brandeis]. Although a court had not recognized the right to
privacy until 1890, "the right to be let alone" had been

coined in 1888. id. at 195 (citing T. COOLEY, A
THE TORTS

29 (1888)).
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would disclose a private family event. 24 In their ar-

ticle they declared that news reports by the popular yellow press too often violated the privacy of
individuals. 2 5 "The intensity and complexity of
life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world,"
Warren and Brandeis wrote, "and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy
26
have become more essential to the individual."
Although the term "privacy" cannot be found in
the Constitution, over time the Supreme Court
has recognized an implicit constitutional protection for a limited right to privacy. 27 The Court
first found an implied right of privacy in the Constitution in 1965 when it held that a state government may not interfere with a married couple's
right to use contraceptives. 28 In Griswold v. Connecticut,29 the Court struck down a Connecticut
statute that prohibited the sale of contraceptive
devices. The Court held the state law violated a
right of privacy implied in the Bill of Rights, specifically in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments. 3" Collectively, these Amendments establish "zones of privacy" where individu3
als are protected from governmental intrusion. 1
Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for the Court,
said "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.
32
Various guarantees create zones of privacy."
The Court reinforced this implied constitu24

See

JEFFREY

ROSEN,

THE

UNWANTED

GAZE:

THE

DE-

STRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 43 (2000).
25
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23,

at 196.
Id.
27
See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. According to Lawrence
26

Tribe, Griswold represents, among other ideas, a rule against
cramped construction and permits an implied right of privacy that can be found in the Constitution's "spirit and structure." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1308-09.
29
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
30 Id. at 484.
3'1 Id.
32 Id.

(internal citations omitted).
33 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34 Id. at 117-18, 152-54.
35 Id. at 152-53.
36 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972)
(expanding sexual privacy by striking down as unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that prohibited distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried individuals). But see Bowers v.
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tional right of privacy, which protects individuals
from incursions by the state, in 1973 in Roe v.
Wade,"3 when the justices struck down a Texas law
making abortion illegal except to save the life of
the mother. 34 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, who
wrote the opinion for the Court, included Fourteenth Amendment protections for fundamental
liberties among those penumbras of privacy identified in Griswold.35 In a line of cases relying on
Griswold and Roe, the Court over the years also has
established constitutional protection for intimately personal and autonomous decisions in the
areas of sexual relations, 36 marriage, 37 child rear38
ing and education.
The Court's recognition of privacy protection
in these rulings reflects a belief that governmental
incursions into certain areas of private life and
personal decisions are contrary to American traditions and law. A separate theory of privacy, also
grounded in personal and behavioral privacy deriving from Griswold, but focusing instead on
Fourth Amendment interests, emerged in a series
of 1999 cases concerning governmental coopera39
tion with journalists in search of news stories.
B.

FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Law enforcement authorities were deemed in
Wilson v. Layne to have violated citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy by permitting journalists to have access to a private residence during
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-92 (1986) (holding that the
right to privacy under the Constitution does not include a
right for consenting adults to engage in homosexual activity,
even in the privacy of their homes).
-7
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing marriage as a fundamental right and striking down as unconstitutional a Virginia statute that prohibited a white person from marrying anyone other than another white person).
318 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-34 (1972)

(holding that Amish parents had a constitutional right, based
on their right to control their children and their religious
rights, to exempt their children from a Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance law); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1923) (striking down as unconstitutional an

Oregon law that required children to attend public schools);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (striking
down as unconstitutional a Nebraska statute that prohibited
teaching in any language other than English on grounds that
the law violated the rights of parents to make decisions for
their children).
39

See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Hanlon v.

Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F.

Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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an authorized search for a fugitive, 40 and in Lauro
v. City of New York, for arranging a "perp walk" so
journalists could film a criminal suspect for a
news program. 41 In a third case, Hanlon v. Berger,
law enforcement authorities were held in violation of the Fourth Amendment for allowing CNN
reporters to accompany them onto privately
owned land during a criminal investigation. However, they were entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity. 4 2 These rulings all relied on the rationale expressed by Justice Douglas in Griswold; privacy rights flowed from the "emanations" and
"penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments. 43 Several years later, Chief
Justice Warren Burger explicitly acknowledged
the link between the Fourth Amendment and personal/behavioral privacy, writing that "[t] he Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy
of the home, just as it protects other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation,
44
motherhood, child rearing and education."
The Fourth Amendment concept of privacy
that was raised in the aforementioned three cases
served to block time-honored journalistic
newsgathering practices. 45 In Wilson, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that law enforcement officers violated privacy rights implicit in the Fourth
Amendment when they permitted news reporters
to accompany them into a home during the execution of a search warrant. 46 The events that
prompted the suit began with an early morning
raid by U.S. Federal Marshals on a home in Montgomery County, Maryland, that was believed to be
the residence of a fugitive named Dominic Wilson. 47 Wilson was a target of "Operation Gun-

smoke," a national crackdown on dangerous
criminals who were wanted for serious drug offenses and violent felonies.4 8 A Gunsmoke team
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605.
Lauro, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 363-65.
42
Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810.
43 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
44 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973). "Indeed," Tribe writes, "privacy of the home has the longest constitutional pedigree of the lot." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1412
§15-19. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)
(Justice Stevens adhered to the Fourth Amendment in writing that in no setting is "the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home."). See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (recognizing that "the

of U.S. Marshals and local police raided the residence where Wilson was believed to be hiding on
April 16, 1992. Officers were accompanied by a reporter and photographer from The Washington
Post.49 These so-called press "ride-alongs" were a
common and longtime practice in which news reporters accompanied law enforcement officials on
50
arrests and property searches.
The occupants of the home, Charles and Geraldine Wilson, the parents of the suspect, were in
bed when they heard police enter the residence.
Charles Wilson investigated the situation while
still dressed in his sleepwear. When he saw several
men in street clothes brandishing guns, he angrily
demanded that they explain what they were doing
in his house. Believing that Charles Wilson was
51
the suspect, officers wrestled him to the floor.
After Charles Wilson's identity was determined,
the Gunsmoke team and the Washington Postjournalists left. During the raid, the Washington Post
photographer took numerous photographs, and
the reporter observed the confrontation between
officers

and

Charles

Wilson. 52

The Wilsons

brought suit against the federal government in
U.S. District Court on a claim that their Fourth
Amendment privacy rights were violated. 5 3 The

district court denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the U.S. Marshal's Office and the
Montgomery County Sheriff's Department. 54 On
appeal, the Third Circuit ruled that the officers
had a "qualified immunity" from damages because the question of "media presence during a
police entry into a residence" as a violation of the
Fourth Amendment had never been clearly established. 55
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit's ruling, but the Court also considered the
Fourth Amendment question, which the appeals

40

Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F.

41

Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.
46

Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places").
45
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Hanlon v.

47

Id. at 606-08.

Id. at 606.
Id. at 606-07.
50
Id. at 615-16 (citing Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340
So.2d 914, 918 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 930, 53 L.Ed. 2d
245, 97 S.Ct. 2634 (1977) (holding it is a "'widespread practice of long-standing"' for media to accompany officers into
homes").
Id. at 607.
51
Id. at 607-08.
52
5-1 Id. at 608.
48

49

54

55

Id.
Id.
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court had sidestepped in its ruling.5 6 The Court

held that "it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or
other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when presence of the third parties" was not necessary to aid in the warrant's execution. 5 7 The Court acknowledged that "the constitutional question presented" in the case was "by
no means open and shut. '5 8 Recognizing that
"[a]ccurate media coverage of police activities
serves an important public purpose," and "ridealongs" were a common police practice, 59 the
Court observed, however, that privacy rights in
one's home have a tradition that can be traced
back to 1604 when an English court made the
declaration that the "house of every one is to him
as his castle and fortress." 60 The Court said the
Fourth Amendment "embodies this centuries-old
principle of respect for the privacy of the
home." 6 1 Although the officers had a warrant that
lawfully permitted them to enter the Wilsons'
home, "it does not necessarily follow that they
were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a
photographer with them. ' 62 Reasoning that the
"presence of reporters inside the home was not
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion" - the arrest of Dominic Wilson - the Court
concluded that police violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the fugitive's parents. 63
In deciding a similar privacy-rights issue at the
same time as Wilson, the Court ruled that a
rancher's Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when CNN joined federal agents who raided a
75,000-acre ranch in Montana. 64 In Hanlon v. Berger, the Court held that U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service agents, who executed a search warrant on a
rancher suspected of killing eagles, violated the
rancher's constitutional rights because agents permitted a CNN news crew to accompany them on
the raid. 65 The Wildlife Service had agreed to give
CNN exclusive rights to the story. A CNN news
Id. at 609-11.
Id. at 614.
58
Id. at 615.
59
Id. at 615-16.
60 Id. at 609-10 (citing Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194,
5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 195 (K.B. 1604)). See also 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223
(Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publ'g Ltd. 2001) (1765).
61
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610.
62
Id. at 611.
56
57

63
64

Id.
Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 809.
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crew joined the agents when the warrant was
served and also filmed the search for evidence on
the ranch's property and outbuildings. The news
crew did not enter the Berger's residence, but the
lead agent who entered the home of Paul Berger
wore a transmitter so that the crew could hear the
conversation between the agent and Berger. The
Court concluded that the facts alleged in Berger
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation as established under Wilson.6 6 However, the Court also
held that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was
protected from civil liability under the "qualified
immunity doctrine" - they were law enforcement
officers serving a properly executed search warrant. CNN did not qualify for such protection,
however, and thus it was civilly liable for damages
for intrusion even though its photographers accompanied the agents with the agents' permission
and cooperation.
The Fourth Amendment principle of privacy
also was successfully invoked in a 1999 news media case concerning a New York "perp walk. ' 67 A

"perp walk" is a police term that refers to escorting a criminal suspect outside a precinct station
for the news media. 68 In Lauro v. City of New York,

the court found that a burglary suspect's privacy
rights were violated when police took him on a
"perp walk," which was filmed and later broadcast
by a local television station. 69 John Lauro, Jr., a
Manhattan doorman, had been accused of burglarizing a residence in the building where he
worked while the tenants were on vacation in September 1995.70 The alleged burglary took place
while Lauro was checking the unit at the request
of the tenant, who had asked Lauro to drop off
mail and water plants. 7 1 Unknown to Lauro, the
tenant had set up a hidden baby camera that
taped Lauro's movements in the apartment. 72 After the tenant returned, he viewed the twenty-minute tape and saw Lauro looking in several drawers

65
Id. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had obtained
the warrant for the ranch due to the owner's unlawful taking
of wildlife. Id.
66

Id.

Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 2d 351
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (reversed and remanded on the issue of the po67

lice officer's qualified immunity).
68 Id, at 357.

71

Id. at 354.
Id. at 354-55, 357.
Id. at 355.

72

Id.

(;9

70
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in the unit on different occasions. 73 The tenant

sold the tape to New York's Fox 5 News for $200
and then filed burglary charges against Lauro
74
with the New York police.
After Lauro's arrest, a local television station
asked the police to take him on a "perp walk"
outside the precinct station. 75 Journalists often
are notified of a "perp walk" in advance by police
seeking publicity in an arrest; sometimes, "perp
walks" are staged at the request of the news media, usually local television stations in search of
easy film footage to accompany televised news reports. 7 6

Lauro's "perp walk" was requested by Fox

5 News, which later filmed a handcuffed Lauro as
officers took him from a police cruiser into the
station. 77 That footage was later broadcast on the
news program, along with the baby-camera foot78
age of Lauro rifling through the apartment.
Lauro brought suit against the City of New York,
claiming the "perp walk" violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.7 9 The District Court for the

Southern District of New York held that police violated Lauro's privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable
searches and seizures." s0 The district court said
the filming and publication of Lauro's image during the "perp walk" was an unlawful seizure of his
"image" and invaded the suspect's privacy."' The
court reasoned that in addition to one's person
and residence, illegal seizures under the Fourth
Amendment also apply to "intangibles such as
plaintiffs own image and the sound of his
voice." 82 The court asserted further that the "perp

walk" was conducted to humiliate the suspect, and
it offered no legitimate law enforcement objective
83
or justification:
In addition to the indignity of the walk itself is the fact
73

Id. at 356.

74
75
76

Id.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 357.
Id.

that the police were aware that the walk was to be featured on the Fox 5 News and exposed to the entire New
York metropolitan area. All this in a nation where an
accused
is presumed to be innocent until proven other84
wise.

The cases discussed in this section are among a
growing list of legal challenges in which the news
media have come under attack on grounds that
their newsgathering practices were impermissible.8 5 The difference is that Wilson, Hanlon and
Lauro were decided on constitutional grounds,
whereas other rulings have been grounded in tort
and statutory jurisprudence. For example, courts
have allowed a traffic accident victim to sue a television program for intrusion after the program
broadcast her rescue without her consent; 6 permitted a supermarket company to recover damages for "breach of duty of loyalty" and trespass
after reporters working undercover took jobs in
one of its stores and secretly filmed unsanitary
conditions; 7 allowed a psychic hotline employee
to sue a TV news program after a reporter took a
job as a "psychic" and secretly taped conversations
on the premises of the psychic telemarketing business;"" and upheld a California statute that blocks
access to police records by companies that seek
the information for commercial purposes.8 9
Collectively, the body of constitutional privacy
law from Griswold to Hanlon represents a form of
privacy that shields individuals from unwanted
governmental incursions into the most deeply
personal and intimate areas of people's lives. In
the period between Griswold and Hanlon, the Supreme Court also recognized that constitutional
protections extend beyond personal and behavioral privacy into so-called information privacy.
This form of constitutional privacy presents a new
and special problem for the ability of the press to

82

Lauro, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 363-64.
Id.

sanitary food-handling practices); Sanders v. American
Broad. Cos., Inc., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (holding that a
plaintiff can sue a news program for intrusion for using a
hidden camera that taped the inside of a psychic telemarketing business under news media investigation); Shulman v.
Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) (holding
that an auto accident victim can bring a claim for intrusion
against a TV program that filmed her rescue without her consent). For a comprehensive account of these and other cases
that deal with privacy issues and media, see CLAY CALVERT,

83

Id.

VOYEUR NATION:

84

Id. at 363.

CULTURE

77
78
79

80

81

Id. at 354.
Id. at 363-64. See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

85
See, e.g., Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 194
F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a supermarket com-

pany can recover damages for "breach of duty of loyalty" and
trespass in a case in which two ABC reporters assumed false
identities to get jobs and used hidden cameras to expose un-

86

87

MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN

MODERN

(2000).

Shulman, 955 P.2d at 475.

Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 510.
Sanders, 978 P.2d at 69.
89 L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp.,
528 U.S. 32, 34-36 (1999).
88
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gather information and for the general public including special-interest groups, researchers,
scholars, businesses and attorneys - to seek access
to government-held information. As Part III will
show, information privacy can be raised as a constitutional bar to deny public access to government-held records that otherwise would be disclosable under statutory open-records lawsY0

(V/ol. 11

prevent doctors from authorizing excessive or
multiple prescriptions.9 " The law was challenged
on privacy grounds by a group of patients and
prescribing doctors who argued that the law infringed on doctor-patient confidentiality and violated one of the constitutionally protected "zones
of privacy."99 The challengers argued that individuals have a right to avoid disclosure of personal
matters. 100

III.

SHIELDING PERSONAL INFORMATION
FROM DISCLOSURE

A.

The Court Recognizes a Second Stream of
Privacy

The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutionally protected right of information privacy in
197791 when it decided Whalen v. Roe 2 and Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services.9' In these two
cases, the Court declared that the constitutional
right to privacy, which could be outweighed by
the public interest in disclosure, applied not only
to individual autonomy in intimately personal
matters, but also to the individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of highly personal information.

94

In Whalen, the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to a New York statute, which required
that doctors and pharmacies provide the state
with forms pertaining to prescriptions of legal, yet
dangerous drugs. 95 Under the law, the identifying
information on these forms, including the names
and addresses of patients, doctors and pharmacists, would be entered in a centralized computer
database.9 6 The legislature passed this statute due
to concerns that these drugs were being "diverted
into unlawful channels." 9 7 The law was intended

to prevent individuals from stealing or revising
prescriptions; to prevent unscrupulous pharmacists from filling prescriptions unlawfully; and to
90

See, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055

(6th Cir. 1998).
91

See

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCI-

826 (2d ed. 2002). FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 62-63 (1997).
92 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
93 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
94
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Nixon v.
Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 532-33 (1977).
95 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
96
Id. at 591.
97 Id. at 591-92.
98
Id. at 592.
PLES AND POLICIES

99

Id. at 595-96.

Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court in Whalen,"" explicitly identified two
different forms of constitutional privacy interests.' 0 2 Until Whalen, the Court had recognized
only the form of personal and behavioral constitutional privacy that derived from the Griswold and
Wade line of cases. 10 3 Stevens said the constitutional right of privacy also recognizes information
privacy, or the "individual's [privacy] interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. 1 0° 4 He
wrote:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in
the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution
of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision
of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces,
and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require
the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.10 5

The Court, however, rejected the privacy argument, noting that the state had an important interest in tracking the use of potentially dangerous
0 6
prescription drugs that had a history of abuse.'
Additionally, the state had taken security precautions and provided procedural safeguards to keep
the database information from being deliberately
or unintentionally disclosed.' °' 7 Nonetheless,
Whalen remains the principal decision concerning
constitutional protection of information privacy. 0I 8 The Whalen Court's recognition of constiI00
"'I

Id. at 598-99.
Justices William J. Brennan and Potter Stewart wrote

concurring opinions. Id. at 606-07.
Id. at 599-600. See also TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1302.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
104
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
105
Id. at 605.
I06 Id. at 602.
17
Id. at 600.
18 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th
Cir. 1998).
102

103
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would be returned."" Nixon argued he could
withhold the materials under executive privilege
and that the Act was a constitutional violation of
the separation of powers." 9 As the Court did in
Whalen, the Nixon Court recognized informational
privacy in nondisclosure of personal informa-

tutionally protected information privacy has been
followed by the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and
Ninth Circuits. 10 9 In these cases, which involved
disclosure of personnel information,"" medical
records 1" and financial information, 1 2 courts
recognized that individuals have a constitutionally
protected right of privacy (which must be
weighed against the state's interest) not to have
personal information disclosed. For example, the
Sixth Circuit, relying on Whalen, said "[P]rivacy
cases have developed along two distinct lines. The
first line of cases involves the individual's interest
in independent decision making in important lifeshaping matters, while the second line of cases
recognizes the individual's interest in avoiding
' 13
disclosure of highly personal matters." "
Likewise, in Nixon v. Administratorof General Services, 14 the Court also discussed the privacy interest in nondisclosure of personal information
when it acknowledged the personal and private
nature of some of President Nixon's confidential
5
papers, tape recordings and other materials.' '
Nixon brought the suit to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute that controlled public
access to presidential papers. 1 6 He was required
under the Presidential Recordings and Materials

tapping case, the Court recognized a privacy interest in an individual's telephone conversation, declaring that the Fourth Amendment extends be1 24
yond "tangible items." 123 In Katz v. United States,
one of the earliest informational privacy cases,
Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the Court, clarified the privacy interest in the Fourth Amendment by declaring that it "protects people, not

Preservation Act ("the Act"),' 1 1 7 which was signed

places."' 125 However, in this case about an FBI

into law by President Ford after Nixon resigned,
to submit his personal papers and recordings to
the Administrator of General Services so the
materials could be processed and screened to determine which ones would be subject to public access and which were personal and private and

wiretap of a national illegal-gambling operation,
the seven-to-one majority stopped short of estab26
lishing a general right to information privacy.
Nearly a decade later, the Court specifically declined to expand privacy protection beyond those
27
areas recognized in the Griswold line of cases.'

109 See id.; Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. 72 F.3d
1133 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 941
F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d

433 U.S. 425 (1977).
Id. at 457 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
116 Id. at 430.
117
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act, Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695-1698, §101-106 (Dec. 19,
1974).

1554 (2d Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638
F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d

Cir. 1978); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
110 See generally Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d

tion. 12 1 However, the Court ruled seven-to-two

against Nixon. In an opinion written by Justice
WilliamJ. Brennan, the Court held that under the
circumstances in that particular case, informational privacy rights did not apply because of
Nixon's public-figure status and the high public
interest in Nixon's materials. 12 1
Although the Court did not recognize information privacy until Whalen, the history of this
stream of privacy can be traced to issues that came
before the Court several times before and after
Whalen and Nixon were decided.

1 19

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429.
Id.
at 439-41.

111 See generally Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of the

120

Id. at 457.

Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Schacter v. Whalen, 581
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978).
112 See generally Barry v. City of N.Y., 712 F.2d 1554 (2d
Cir. 1983); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
113 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at
598-600). Kallstrom is an important case in this analysis, and it
will be discussed in detail later in the text. In Kallstrom, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Whalen when it held that
a constitutional right of information privacy can trump the
disclosure requirements in Ohio's open records law. Id. at
1061-63.

In a 1967 wire-

114
115

1055 (6th Cir. 1998).

U.S., 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec.

22

118

Id. at 465.
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n., 514 U.S.
334 (1995); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). See also Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held Information in the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rhv. 543, 587
(1993) [hereinafter Bunker].
123
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
121

122

124
125
126
127

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351.
See Bunker, supra note 122.
See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
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In Paul v. Davis,12 8 a shoplifting suspect asserted
that police violated his constitutional rights when
police included his photo and name on a flyer of
"active shoplifters.'

2

9

Chief Justice Rehnquist,

writing for the five-to-three majority, noted that in
Griswold and its progeny, the Court found "limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct."'

30

However, the Court concluded

that the shoplifting suspect's privacy claim, contending that the state may not publicize a record
of an official act such as an arrest, was "far afield
from this line of decisions...

and we decline to

enlarge them in this manner." 131
In the same year that the Court decided Paul,
the Court voted seven-to-two to reverse a Fifth Circuit decision that held that an individual's bank
records could not be subpoenaed.

-

2

The Fifth

Circuit reasoned that the documents fell within a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy.13 3 The
respondent, who was tried for running a moonshine-whiskey still, was convicted, in part, on the
basis of his subpoenaed bank records. The Fifth
Circuit relied on the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" rationale argued in Katz. 134 Justice Powell, writing for the Court and reversing the court
of appeals, rejected the bootlegger's reasonable
expectation of privacy claim.1

35

The Court side-

stepped the question of whether the bootlegger
had a right of information privacy, declaring that
the records were not confidential communications at all, but rather were negotiable instruments used in commercial transactions, which
were voluntarily submitted to the bank and exposed to bank employees in the ordinary course
36

of business. 1

Almost two decades after the Whalen and Nixon
decisions, the Court held that the First Amendment protected the right of anonymity for the author of a political pamphlet. 13 7 In a 1995 opinion

129

424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Id. at 694-95.

130

Id. at 713.

131

Id.
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 437.
Id. at 442.
Id.

128

132
133

134
'35
136

137

Id.
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S.

334 (1995).
138 See id. at 357.
139 See id. at 340.
140
Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added).
141

Id. at 357.
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that struck down as unconstitutional an Ohio statute that prohibited distribution of anonymous
campaign literature, the Court found an implicit
and constitutionally protected right of privacy in
political communications.1 38 In McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, the state argued that the statute served a state interest by providing a means to
identify persons responsible for fraud and libel. 13 9
In a seven-to-two opinion written by Justice John
Paul Stevens, the Court stated, "The decision in
favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about
social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as
much of one's privacy as possible."'14 0 As such, the privacy afforded by anonymity in political communications "exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill
of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation - and their ideas from suppression - at the
14 1
hand of an intolerant society."'
The right of information privacy emerged again
in 1998, clashing this time with the right of public
and press access to government-held information.
The Sixth Circuit held that an individual's right of
nondisclosure of private information also means
that private information contained in a government record may be withheld, despite the fact
that the record would otherwise be disclosable
142
under a state open-records law.
B.

Information Privacy Clashes with Public
Access

Philosophers, legal scholars and other commentators have written extensively about the close
relationship between public access to government-held information and democracy.143 Alexander Meiklejohn, a philosopher and educator who
was a leading figure in the modern development
142
See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th
Cir. 1998).

See generallyJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY

143
KARL

R.

OFJUSTICE

POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES

HAROLD C.

[hereinafter

CROSS,

THE

PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW

CROSS]; ALEXANDER

MEIKLEJOHN,

(1971);

(1971);
(1953)

FREE SPEECH

(1948) [hereinafter
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH]. See also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J.
523, 554-67 (1977); Thomas 1. Emerson; Legal Foundations of
the Right to Know, WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1976); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245, 257 (1961)
[hereinafter Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment].
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
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However, unlike the First Amendment right to
publish lawfully obtained information, particularly information pertaining to governmental and
public affairs, 14 7 the Court has refused to recognize any superior constitutional rights for the

press to gather news or for the public or press to
gain access to government-held information or
14
operations, regardless of public-interest value.
In order to provide for such public access, Con150
gress 149 and the legislatures in all fifty states
have enacted freedom of information statutes,
which, to varying degrees, open government
records to public inspection. The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") is the federal records-disclosure statute. 51 The FOIA requires that federal
executive branch agencies provide any person access to all records, unless the records fall under
any one of the nine statutory exemptions. 152 Congress created the exemptions to balance the social

144 See Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, An Informing
Press: The Search for a ConstitutionalPrinciple, 68 CAL. L. REv
483, 503 (1980) ("The conception of democracy apparently
embraced by proponents of the 'right to know' echoes the
view of Alexander Meiklejohn, whose insights into the relevance of self-government to [F]irst [Almendment analysis
have been of seminal importance."); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 4
("It has been suggested that the right to know be adopted as
the sole, or at least the principal, basis for the constitutional
protection afforded by the [F]irst [A] mendment. Alexander
Meiklejohn is the primary source of this theory.").
145 MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 143, at 88.
146 See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment, supra note 143,
at 257.
147 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
913 (1982) ("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.")
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964));
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) ("The maintenance
of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system.") (quoting Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)); Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (There is a "profound national commitment" to the
principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people.").
148
See generally Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington
Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974). In a series of cases during the
1980s, the Supreme Court held that the general public has a
qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal court
proceedings and records. See generally Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enterprise v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). But even this presumed that the

First Amendment right of access to criminal court proceedings and records is a qualified one and does not automatically stop all court closures. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982). "The presumption
[of a public trial] may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
Press-Enterprise,464 U.S. at 510.
149 See 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000).
150 See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE §§6250-68 (West 1995);
COLO. REv. STAT. §24-72-203 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. §1212 (1998); D.C. CODE ANN. §§2-531 to -539 (2002); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§119.01 to .15 (West 2002); IND. CODE. ANN. §§514-3-1 to -10 (Michie 2001); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§61-810 to
850 (Michie 1993); Mo. REv. STAT. §610.010 to .030 (West
2000); NEB. REv. STAT. §§84-712.01 to .09 (1999); N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAw §§84-90 (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§132-1
to -10 (2001); N.D. CONST. art. XI, §6; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
51, §§24A.1 to .19 (West 2000); OR. REv. STAT. §§192.410 to
.505 (2001); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§66.1 to .4 (West
2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§315-320 (1995); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. §§16-4-201 to -205 (Michie 2001).
151 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000). The federal government first
attempted legislation to provide for access to federal records
in 1946 when it enacted Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §1002 (1946) (original version at ch.
324, §3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946)) (revised by 5 U.S.C. §552
(1966)). However, that legislation was full of gaping loopholes that enabled government agencies to use it as a withholding statute. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973); H.
REp. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at §3 (1966) (stating that
"[flor more than 10 years, through the administrations of
both political parties, case after case of improper withholding
based upon [the APA] has been documented. The Administrative Procedure Act provides no adequate remedy to members of the public to force disclosures in such cases."). In
1966, as a response to the flawed APA disclosure section,
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act, which
opened to public inspection the records of the executive
branch administrative agencies.
152
5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)-(9) (2000). The FOIA does not
apply to matters that fall under the categories of: (1) classified information and national security; (2) internal agency
personnel information; (3) information exempted by statutes; (4) trade secrets and other confidential business information; (5) agency memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade
personal privacy; (7) law enforcement investigation records;

of democratic

political theory and the First

Amendment, 144 wrote that for people to be their

own rulers, it is essential that "whatever truth may
become available shall be placed at the disposal of
all the citizens of the community."' 14 5 Professor

Meiklejohn believed "[p]ublic discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of information and opinion bearing on those issues, must
have a freedom unabridged by our agents.'

14 6
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and democratic value of the public's statutory
right to know against the government's need to
keep some information secret. 153 Two of those exemptions concern privacy.' 54 All the states have
analogous open-records statutes, many of which
are modeled after the FOIA. 15 5 Similarly, state

statutes have some form of exemption that allows
withholding of a record if its disclosure would
156
pose an invasion of privacy.

Conflicts commonly arise when the need of
some citizens to obtain government-held information results in the disclosure of private information of other citizens.' 57 Typically, courts decide
legal challenges to requests for government
records by weighing the democratic value of access to the information against the individual
(8) reports from regulated financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical information. Id.
153 At the same time that a broad philosophy of "freedom of information" is enacted into law, it is necessary to
protect certain equally important rights of privacy with respect to certain information in government files, such as
medical and personnel records. It is also necessary for the
very operation of our government to allow it to keep confidential certain material, such as the investigatory files of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 38
(1974). The FOIA Source Book of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, is a primary source for the legislative
history of the FOIA.
154
Exemption 6 permits the withholding of "personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000). Exemption 7(C) permits the withholding of "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes," if their disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C) (2000).
155
State statutes providing for public access to government records were enacted as early as 1849, when the Wisconsin legislature passed a public records law. See Public Inspection of State and Municipal Executive Documents: "Eveiybody,
Practically Everything, Anytime, Except ....",45 FORDIlAM L.
REv. 1105, 1105 (1977). Only about a dozen states enacted
statutes that controlled access to public records before 1940,
but those laws were brief in length and lacked clear guidelines. Id. at 1107. By 1950, at least 11 states had already enacted limited open-records statutes. See CROSS, supra note
143, at 328-36.
156
See infra note 150.
157
See, e.g.,
Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519
U.S. 355 (1997) (rejecting on privacy grounds an environmental group's FOIA request for contact information of individuals who received a Bureau of Land Management newsletter about the future of the Oregon High Desert); U.S. Dep't
of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487
(1994) (rejecting on privacy grounds a FOIA request by unions for home addresses of federal employees for the pur-

value of privacy.' 5 This calculus for determining
whether a record should be released was signifi-

cantly altered by the Sixth Circuit in a dispute
over an Ohio public records law that said police

59
personnel files qualified as disclosable records.1
The Sixth Circuit, relying on Whalen and Nixon as
precedent, held that the records were shielded
from access on the basis of information privacy. 160
In Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, three undercover officers sought damages from the City of
Columbus when the city released copies of the officers' personnel files to a defense attorney during
a criminal trial. 16 1 The city said the records fell
under the disclosure requirements of the Ohio
Public Records Act.'16 2 The officers argued that releasing the files violated the officers' rights to in-

poses of contacting them about union membership); Dep't
ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749 (1989) (rejecting a journalist's FOIA request for a
FBI rap sheet of a reputed crime figure suspected of bribing
a congressman to obtain a federal contract, on grounds that
releasing the information would be an invasion of privacy because the rap sheet would not shed any light on official
agency operations or activities); Fed. Bureau of Investigation
v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982) (rejecting a journalist's
FOIA request for FBI reports requested by President Nixon,
who ordered FBI background checks on his political enemies, on grounds that information originally compiled for
law-enforcement purposes does not lose its privacy-exemption status merely because the information is reproduced in a
new document that is not for law-enforcement purposes);
Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982)
(rejecting a FOIA request by The Washington Post for passport
application information on two Iranian nationals who traveled under the protection of U.S. passports during a period
of strained relations between Iran and the United States);
Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (upholding a FOIA request by law review editors for summaries of
honor and ethics violations at the U.S. Air Force Academy).
58
This balancing method was established in 1976, when
the Supreme Court first considered a privacy challenge to a
request for a record under the Freedom of Information Act,
which is also a model for many state open-records laws. See
Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, said that when a privacy challenge seeks to block disclosure under FOIA, a balancing test
between the individual value of personal privacy against the
social value of public disclosure should be the device to determine whether a record should be released. The Court said
the Act's privacy exemptions are limited, and they must be
narrowly construed. ]d. at 361. The opinion emphasized that
the exemptions' existence should not "obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant object of the
Act." Id.
159 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th
Cir. 1998).
16(

[i.

I6

Id. at 1059.

162

Oiuio

REV. CODE

§149.43 (2001).
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formation privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. 163 After the officers sued, several Ohio
newspapers and broadcasters also requested the
officers' files, but the city refused to release the
records while the case was pending.1 64 The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
denied the officers' motion for a preliminary injunction, and the officers appealed.' 65 The Sixth
Circuit, explicitly following Whalen, reversed and
held that information privacy can impose restric16 6
tions on the state open-records law.
The facts in the case go back to an investigation
by the undercover officers into drug dealing by a
notorious and violent gang in Columbus. 16 7 In all,
the city prosecuted 41 gang members, and the
three officers testified at a trial for eight of the
defendants.'

68

One of the defense lawyers re-

quested and received the personnel file of undercover officer Melissa Kallstrom, and the lawyer allowed a defendant to review the file during the
trial.' 69 Personnel files typically include officers'
addresses, phone numbers, other identifying information, contact information on family members, bank account information and other private
materials. 1 70 Her fellow undercover officers,

Thomas Coelho and Gary Householder, believed
the lawyer also obtained their files. 171 In addition,
Coelho's file was released to Police Officers for
Equal Rights, an organization that was investigating "possible discriminatory hiring and promo172
tion practices by the city."
The officers sued the city for invasion of privacy
under a civil rights section of the United States
Code. 173 The officers sought damages and an in74
junction barring further release of the files.'
The city argued that it released the files to the de-

fense lawyer and to the police organization after
determining the personnel files did not fall under
any of the exemptions to the Ohio Public Records
Act. 1 75 Additionally, the city had redacted most of
the personal identifying information from the
copies it released. 176 The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio denied the officers'
motion for a preliminary injunction and ruled for
the city. 17 7 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision and remanded the
case for retrial. Citing Whalen, the appeals court
declared that privacy law has developed along two
distinct lines. The first concerns independent decision-making over deeply personal matters and
behavior. The second recognizes an individual's
right to avoid disclosure about personal informa78

tion. 1

Writing the opinion for the Sixth Circuit panel,
Judge Karen Nelson Moore found that when the
release of private information "places an individual at substantial risk of serious bodily harm, possibly even death," the governmental action is subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment and will be upheld only in instances
when the government demonstrates "a compelling state interest, and [the action] is narrowly
drawn to further that state interest. 1 79 The court
held that release of the officers' addresses, phone
numbers and other personal information along
with identifying information of family members
could place the officers or their family members
in a zone of danger. 18 0 Thus, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that prior notice must be given in all future
instances when police files are requested. This
holding placed a condition on disclosure that is
not in the Ohio law. I8 ' The appeals court said the

163

Section 1983 provides for civil liability if a person acting

164

under color of state law deprives another of the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."

Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059.
Several news media outlets later joined the suit as intervenors. They included "The Columbus Dispatch, The Cleveland PlainDealer, The Cincinnati Post, The Akron Beacon journal, The Toledo Blade, The Youngstown Vindicator,The Canton
Repository... Cincinnati television station WCPO, and Cleveland television station WEWS; and, the Ohio Newspaper Association." Kallstrom, 165 F. Supp. 2d 689 n.2 (S.D. Ohio
2001).
165
Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060.
166
Id. at 1060-61, 1069-70.
167
Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059.
168

Id.

169

Id.

170
171

Id.
Id.

172

Id.

173

Id. at 1060. See also 42 U.S.C. §§1983 & 1988 (1994).

42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000).
174
Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059.
175

See id.at 1064-65.

176

Kallstrom, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 700. Neither the district

court nor circuit court opinions explain why it was not em-

phasized during the first trial that the city had redacted most
of the personal identifying information contained in the officers' files. See infra note 186.
177
Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060.
178
Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060-61 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S.
at 598-600; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457).
179
Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1064.
180
Id. at 1067.

181

Id. at 1068-69.
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purpose of requiring prior notice is to allow persons who are the subjects of the records opportunities to ask for an injunction to block disclosure. 182 Significantly, the Sixth Circuit never considered the fact that the city had redacted the objectionable personal and identifying information
in the officers' files before it disclosed copies of
the files. 183
On remand, a reluctant district court panel
held in September 2001 that, pursuant to the
Sixth Circuit decision, prior notice must be given
to police officers before the disclosure of their
personnel files to a member of the public. 18 4 The
district court clearly signaled its concern over the
Sixth Circuit's decision by beginning its own opinion with a quotation from Thomas Jefferson, stating "Our liberty depends on the freedom of the
press, and that cannot be limited without being
lost."' 18 5 Acknowledging that a number of Ohio

newspapers and broadcasters also requested access to the officers' files, 18 6 the district court
framed the issue as one implicating press rights:
In this case, the court is being asked to limit the freedom of the press by preventing the news media from
obtaining public information containedin the city's
personnel files. City police officers fear its publication
may endanger themselves and their families. To deny
members of the press access to public information
solely because they have the ability to disseminate it
would silence
the most important critics of governmen87
tal activity.'

Complying with the Sixth Circuit's ruling, the district court rejected the arguments of the news media that the court of appeals was wrong in recognizing the federal nondisclosure privacy right,
stating, "Establishing new law for the Sixth Circuit, the panel held the Officers had a constitutionally protected privacy right in the information
contained in their personnel files, 'specifically
Id. at 1067-69.
183 On remand, the district court denied the plaintiffs'
request for damages because the specific personal identifying
information, which may have placed them in a zone of danger, was not disclosed. Kallstrom, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 695
(holding that the fact that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that release of the information in their personnel files
would place them at risk for serious bodily harm or threat
thereof, was "fatal to their claims. By not identifying any real
potential danger that could arise from the release of information in their personnel files, plaintiffs have failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to their case for which they carry a burden.").
184
Id. at 703.
185
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689. See also infra note 164.
186
Kallstrom, 165 F. Stipp. 2d at 688.
187
182
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their interest in preserving their lives and the lives
of their family members, as well as preserving
their personal security and bodily integrity."" 8
The Court in Whalen and Nixon seemed to expand the original definition of constitutional privacy as articulated in the Griswold-Roe line. But, it
is noteworthy that the Court's recognition of information privacy was not essential in either of
those holdings. Although the Whalen Court recognized the individual's right of nondisclosure of
personal information, the Court held that the statute in question did not "pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either [privacy] interest to establish
a constitutional violation."' 8 9 After the decisions
were handed down, privacy scholar Don R.
Pember observed, "The question remains whether
recognition of this disclosure interest is an indication of a new basis for constitutional privacy or
merely tantalizing dictum that could be ignored
when the issue is placed squarely before the
Court."191'

An individual's interest in avoiding disclosure
of private information and the concept of constitutionally protected information privacy were
raised before the Supreme Court in a 2001 clash
between the First Amendment right of freedom of
the press and the First Amendment right of private speech.' 9 1
IV.

EXPANDING INFORMATION PRIVACY:
BAR TNICKI v. VOPPER

A.

The Latest Development: First Amendment
Protection for Private Facts
In the first Supreme Court decision in a decade

involving press content, 192 a six-to-three Court
188

Id. at 690 (quoting Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1062). The

district court noted the Sixth Circuit's Kalstrom decision
"strikingly" changed the law of the Circuit. Id. at 690 n.5.
18
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
190 Pember, supra note 4, at 1175.
191 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
192
Until Bartnicki, the Court had not decided a press
content case since 1991. See Masson v. The New Yorker, Inc.,
501 U.S. 496 (1991); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663 (1991). During the decade between the 1991 Masson and
Cohen decisions and the 2001 Barinicki decision, the courts
were defining the First Amendment in other areas, such as in
economic regulations and in content-based versus contentneutral messages. See, e.g., Playboy Entm't Group, Inc. v. U.S.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 702 (1998); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180 (1997); Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d
105 (1995).

20031

Shielding Private Lives From Prying Eyes

majority ruled that the First Amendment protected a Pennsylvania radio station from liability
and punishment for broadcasting a secretly taped
cell phone conversation between two teachers
union representatives. 19 3 The ruling in Bartnicki v.
Vapper' 9 4 represents a free press victory, but a very
limited one. The Court repeatedly emphasized
the decision was narrowly drawn and limited to
only the facts presented in that case. 19 5 However,
Bartnicki's significance extends beyond its narrow
ruling. According to First Amendment attorney
James C. Goodale, former counsel to The New York
Times, this opinion, which recognizes a First
Amendment right of private speech, also marks
the first time the Supreme Court has found a constitutional right of information privacy in truthful
private facts in a press context.196 Although Bartnicki recognizes constitutional protection for private facts, it differs notably from the aforementioned privacy cases because the Bartnicki questions do not pertain to state action. Rather, Bartnicki focuses on third-party incursions and statutory privacy violations by the news media.
The events that triggered the Bartnicki suit began in May 1993 when an unknown person intercepted and taped a conversation between
Anthony F. Kane, a Wilkes-Barre area school
teacher and union president, and Gloria Bart193
194

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
Id. at 514.

Id. at 524-25, 528-29.
Id. at 517, 527-28. See James C. Goodale, Bartnicki:
Publish News That's Private But True?, NEW YORK L. J., Aug. 3,
195
196

2001, at 3 [hereinafter Goodale].

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19.
Id. Bartnicki was one of three wiretap cases appealed
to the Court, but it was the only one decided by the Court.
197

198

nicki, the union's chief negotiator. It was a time of
contentious contract negotiations, and they discussed whether the teachers would receive the
raise offered by the Wyoming Valley West School
District or the raise proposed by the teachers
union.1 97 Kane was taped as saying, "If they're not
going to move for three percent, we're gonna
have to go to their homes .. .to blow off their

front porches. We'll have to do some work on
some of those guys."' 9 8
The tape mysteriously ended up in the mail-box
of Jack Yocum, the head of a local taxpayers' organization, who disagreed with the union's demands during contract negotiations. 99 Yocum
said he played the tape and recognized the voices
of Bartnicki and Kane. He then gave it to WilkesBarre WILK Radio talk show host Fred Williams
(whose actual name is Frederick W. Vopper). Williams-Vopper, a vocal critic of the teachers' union,
repeatedly played the tape on the air in the Fall of
1993 after the school district and teachers union
accepted an arbitration proposal that was gener20 0
ally favorable to the teachers.
Bartnicki and Kane brought suit against the radio station for playing the tape. They sought actual damages and punitive damages under federal
and state wiretapping laws. 20 1 They based their
federal claims on the Electronic Communications
taped by a Florida couple, who forwarded the tape to McDermott, the ranking Democrat on the House Ethics Committee,

on January 8, 1997. Id. "The next day, McDermott gave copies of the tape to the New York Times, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and Roll-Call." Id. Each newspaper ran a story on the
conversation. Three days later, McDermott gave copies of the
tape to fellow committee members, and then he resigned
from the committee. The Florida couple publicly confessed

to taping the conversation and giving a copy to McDermott.

The Court denied certiorari to Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221
F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1051 (2001).
See infra note 275 for an explanation of Peavy. Although the
Supreme Court granted certiorarito Boehner v. McDermott, 191
F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the Court vacated the judgment

Id. They were prosecuted under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and were fined $1,000. See 18 U.S.C. §§2511,
2520 (2000). Boehner sued McDermott for $10,000 in statu-

and remanded Boehner to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing "for further consideration in light of" Bartnicki. McDer-

knowledge that it was illegally intercepted. Id. at 466. The

mott v. Boehner, 532 U.S. 1050, 1050 (2001) (vacated). The

D.C. District Court was expected to hear the case in late 2002

tapping is unlawful, and it is also unlawful to disclose contents of an unlawfully taped communication. 18 U.S.C.

or early 2003. Boehner concerned a suit brought by Ohio Re-

§2511 (1) (c) (2000).

tory damages under the Act, claiming that McDermott had
illegally disclosed the contents of the conference call with the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act says the act of wire-

publican Congressman John A. Boehner against Washington

199

Democratic Congressman James A. McDermott. The suit was

200
201

over a conference-call between Boehner and three other
prominent Republican leaders: Dick Armey, Tom DeLay and

Newt Gingrich. The call, which took place in December
1996, was intercepted on a scanner and taped as Boehner was
driving through Florida. At the time, Gingrich was under investigation by the House Ethics Committee, and the conver-

sation focused on a strategy to soften the public impact of the
investigation. Boehner, 191 F.3d at 465. The conversation was

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.

Id.

See id. See also 28 U.S.C. §2510 (2000); 18 PA. C.S.A.
§5701 (1980). Federal law has prohibited disclosures of illegally intercepted telephone conversations since the Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000). See also Nardone v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (holding that an illegally
intercepted telephone conversation was "a fruit of a poisonous tree"); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the
attachment of a recording device to a phone booth consti-
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Privacy Act of 1986202 and their state claims on
the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act.2 0 3 The laws apply not only

to any person who intercepts phone conversations, 204 but also to any person who discloses the
information knowing, or having reason to know,
that the communication was unlawfully obtained. 2 15 The radio station argued that to penalize disclosure would violate its right to broadcast
under the First Amendment. The station noted
that it did not participate in the unlawful taping,
that its access to the information was acquired legally; and the information was of public concern.

20 6

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania dismissed a motion by the radio
station for summary judgment and held that the
case should go to trial.20 7 The court reasoned that
"a violation of these acts can occur by the
mere
finding that a defendant had a reason to believe
that the communication that he disclosed or used
was obtained [illegally]. "20 On appeal, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed
the judgment. In its analysis, the Third Circuit
found the wiretapping laws to be content-neutral
and applied intermediate scrutiny as the standard
of review. 20 0 The court of appeals concluded that
the First Amendment precludes imposition of
civil damages against the news media for disclosing a taped conversation containing "information
of public significance" when the news media
"played no direct or indirect role in the unlawful
2

interception.,"

10

Although the Third Circuit recognized a significant state interest in protecting the privacy of cell
phone conversations, it held that "the governtuted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment). And
in 1968 Congress observed:
Tremendous scientific and technological developments
that have taken place in the last century have made possible today the wide-spread use and abuse of electronic
surveillance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized ....

No longer is it possible, in short, for each man

to retreat into his home and be left alone. Every spoken
word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious,
political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by
an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the
auditor's advantage.
S. REP. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 (1968) (Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Acts of 1968).
202
28 U.S.C. §2510 (2000).
203
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5701 (1980).
204
18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) (2000).
205
18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c) (2000).
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ment's significant interest in protecting privacy is
not sufficient [in this instance] to justify the serious burdens the damages provision of the Wiretapping Acts place on free speech." 211 The appeals court reasoned that to apply the damages
provision to the news media would "deter the media from publishing even material that may law' 212
fully be disclosed under the Wiretapping Acts."
The appeals court said, "Reporters often will not
know the precise origins of information they receive from witnesses and other sources, nor
whether the information stems from a lawful
source."2 1 3 The Third Circuit emphasized that the

public interest in the taped conversation and the
newsworthiness of the story were important stan214
dards to be considered.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority
held in a narrowly focused opinion that the radio
station was free to publish private information
under the facts presented in this case, namely that
the conversation concerned a matter of public interest;2 15 the news media were not participants in
the unlawful taping; 2 16 and the news media did
not unlawfully gain access to the tape.2 1 7 justices

William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented.
The Bartnicki Court majority agreed with the
lower court that the wiretap statutes are contentneutral laws of general applicability, but the Court
did not agree with the lower court's application of
intermediate scrutiny.2' 8 The Bartnicki Court, relying on Smith v. Daily Mail PublishingCo., 219 instead

reviewed the federal and Pennsylvania statutes
under the strict scrutiny standard of review, finding, 2211 "As a general matter, 'state action to pun-

ish the publication of truthful information sel206

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.

20)7

See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999).

208

209
210
211

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

212

Id. at 126-27.

213

Id. at 127.
Id.

214

at
at
at
at

115.
121.
112, 129.
129.

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529, 540.
Id. at 525, 527-28.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 521-22, 526.
219
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
2201
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28 (citing Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 103). Under the strict scrutiny standard of review the
215

216

government can only compel disclosure of information if the
government can prove its use of the information would advance a legitimate state interest, and that its action is nar-
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dom can satisfy constitutional standards.

. . [I]f

a

newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication
of the information, absent a need... of the highest order.' "221
The majority of six justices held that the federal
and Pennsylvania statutes' prohibitions on disseminating intercepted communications did not serve
a need of the highest order. 222 Writing for the

Court majority, Justice John Paul Stevens rejected
the government's two arguments: 1) that the government has an interest in removing incentives
for people to intercept private conversations; and
2) that the government has an interest in minimizing the harm to people whose conversations
have been illegally intercepted.2 23 The Court
held that the interest in removing incentives for
the interception of private conversations would
not be served by punishing someone other than
the party who intercepted the call. 22 4 In its analy-

sis of the second interest (minimizing harm),
which the Court noted was constitutionally
stronger than the first interest (removing incentive), the Court acknowledged that privacy of
communication is an important value, and the
fear of public disclosure of private conversations
might well have a chilling effect on private
speech. 225 The majority concluded, however, that
under the facts in this particular case, the governmental interest in protecting citizens from the
publication of their private communications rowly tailored to meet that legitimate interest. The Court has
said this standard should be applied in issues involving certain fundamental rights that deserve special protection. This
highest level of protection is generally applied to contentbased regulations of speech. Under this standard, the courts

presume a regulation is unconstitutional. The government

while strong enough to be an interest of the highest order - had to "give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public
226
importance."
The Court noted that even Warren and Brandeis conceded that "[t]he right of privacy does
not prohibit any publication of matter which is of
public or general interest." 227 The Bartnicki Court

thus refused to allow "a stranger's illegal conduct ...

to remove the First Amendment shield

from speech about a matter of public concern." 228 In
Justice Stevens's view, a key point was that the
taped phone conversation was of high public concern. Although the statutes could possibly apply
to unlawful "disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private
concern, '

229

the Court reserved this question. Ste-

vens said privacy interests do not bar publication
of information of public interest. 23 0 The Court
found that the disclosed conversation between
the two teachers' union representatives was "un2 31
questionably a matter of public concern."
In reaching its conclusion, the Court made a
significant finding. Stevens, who also wrote the
Whalen v. Roe2 32 opinion twenty-four years earlier,
said the right of individual privacy and the right
to publish information concerning public issues
are deserving of equal constitutional protection
and, therefore, "present a conflict between interests of the highest order - on the one hand, the
interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the
ous. Under ordinary scrutiny, courts presume the regulation
is constitutional, and the plaintiff challenging the regulation
must prove the offending regulation or action is unconstitutional. The government is required to show only that the reg-

ulation or action is "reasonably" related to a "legitimate" government interest and only incidentally affects speech. Ordi-

must bear the burden of proving that the regulation is closely
related to a compelling government interest and show that

nary scrutiny is typically applied to social and economic regu-

the regulation achieves its intended purpose by the least re-

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28 (quoting Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 102-03) (emphasis added).
222
Id. at 531-32.
223 Id. at 529.

strictive means possible.

KERMIT

L.

HALL, ED.,

THE

OXFORD

COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

845 (1992) [hereinafter HALL]. Under intermediate scrutiny,
a governmental regulation must pass the O'Brien test as introduced in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Under this test: (1) the government regulation must be
"within the constitutional power of the government;" (2) the
regulation must further an "important or substantial governmental interest;" (3) the government interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression;" and (4) the "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms"

must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of

lations.

HALL,

supra note 220, at 845.

221

224

Id.

Id. at 32-33 (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random
House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
226
Id. at 533-34 (emphasis added).
227
Id. at 534 (quoting Warren and Brandeis, supra note
23, at 214).
Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
228
229
Id. at 533.
225

that interest." Id. at 377. See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.

230

Id. at 534.

FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997). There is a third level of scru-

231

tiny known as ordinary or minimum scrutiny that is less rigor-

232

Id. at 535.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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other hand, the interest in individual privacy and,

233
more specifically in fostering private speech."

Stevens noted that the "fear of public disclosure
of private conversations might well have a chilling
effect on private speech," and, "[a]ccordingly, it
seems to us that there are important interests to
be considered on both sides of the constitutional
' 23 4

calculus."

Justice Stephen G. Breyer, whose concurrence
was joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, focused more on the specific content of the disclosed remarks and also on the limited public figure status of the speakers themselves. 235 Breyer
emphasized that he concurred in the majority
opinion because, among other factors, the conversation "involved a matter of unusual public
concern, namely a threat of potential physical
harm to others." 236 He said Bartnicki and Kane

had "little or no legitimate interest in maintaining
the privacy of the particular conversation" because the conversation "rais[ed] a significant con23

cern for the safety of others."

1

7

Reasoning that

the speakers' "legitimate privacy expectations are
unusually low, and the public interest in defeating
those expectations is unusually high,"2 3 s Breyer
concluded that the statutes' enforcement would
"disproportionately harm media freedom." 23 9 He
also emphasized that the majority holding was
narrow and "limited to the special circumstances
24
present" in this case. 1

Breyer, however, disagreed with the majority's
use of strict scrutiny as its level of review. He said
that he believed strict scrutiny is not automatically

appropriate in analyzing an issue in which one
constitutional right is pitted against another, as
was the conflict in Bartnicki.24 1 Instead, he suggested that a more flexible balancing test is the
appropriate standard in cases like these. 242 Breyer
explicitly declined to recognize any preference
for press rights over private speech, noting that
the Court's holding "does not imply a significantly
233
234
235

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
Id. at 533.
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539-40 (Breyer, J., concur-

ring).
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

Id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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broader constitutional immunity for the media." 24 3 Finally, Breyer made a point of expressing
particular concern over "the challenges future
technology may pose to the individual's interest in
basic personal privacy" and suggested that they be
more appropriately addressed by the legislature.

24 4

For dissenter Chief Justice Rehnquist, the facts
in Bartnicki demonstrated that technology already
threatens personal privacy and that legal curbs are
necessary to prevent such incursions. 245 In his dis-

senting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, Rehnquist pointed out there are 49.1
million cell phones in operation in the United
States, 246 along with 20 million scanners capable
of intercepting cell phone conversations. 247 He

argued that the majority opinion "diminishes,
rather than enhances, the purposes of the First
Amendment: chilling the speech of the millions
of Americans who rely upon electronic technology to communicate each day. ' 248 Rehnquist's dis-

sent, which favored the interests of private speech
over public speech in a First Amendment tug-ofwar, comes as no surprise. 249 His position was con-

sistent with a philosophy he has expressed at least
as far back as 1974 when he wrote, "Privacy in today's lexicon is a 'good' word; that which increases privacy is considered desirable, and that
which decreases it is considered undesirable. It is
25
a 'positive' value.."

0

Rehnquist echoed this view in his dissenting
opinion in Bartnicki when he stated, "The Court
concludes that the private conversation between
Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane is somehow a
'[public] debate ... worthy of constitutional protection.'" 25 1 The Constitution, he argued, "should

not protect the involuntary broadcast of personal
conversations. Even where the communications
involve public figures or concern public matters,
the conversations are nonetheless private and

Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541-42, 549 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
246
Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
247
Id. at 549 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
248
Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
249
Id. at 547, 551-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
250
William H. Rehnquist, Is An Expanded Right of Privacy
Consistent With Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1974).
251
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
244
245
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worthy of protection."'

252

The dissenters sharply

criticized the majority opinion for failing to explicitly define the kinds of information that would
fall under the category of matters of public concern or interest. 253 The dissenters also criticized
the majority for applying strict scrutiny in their
analysis.

2 54

Rehnquist would have permitted enforcement
of the wiretap statutes on the theory that punishment would "dry up the market.

' 255

He argued

that enforcement would deter persons from illegally intercepting communications in the same
way that prosecutions for possession of stolen
goods deters theft by drying up the market for stolen goods. 256 Rehnquist acknowledged that the
wiretap laws may create an incidental burden on
speech but concluded "these statutes further the
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' speech of
the private parties.

B.

25 7

The Bartnicki Court Settles One Issue-But
Raises Many Questions

Although the Court majority emphasized that
the Bartnicki opinion is narrow and limited to the
facts in that particular case, the decision advances
press rights in one important way. It settles the important question of whether the press may publish information it lawfully acquired from a source
who obtained the information unlawfully. 258 This
so-called "stolen goods" issue 259 was raised but not
resolved in the 1971 Pentagon Papers case. 260 In
New York Times v. United States,261 the Court held

that the United States government did not meet
its heavy burden of proof under the circumstances in that case to halt publication of a New
York Times series that traced the history of the
26 2
United States' involvement in the Vietnam war.

The newspaper series was based on a 47-volume
history that was commissioned by the Department

of Defense and came into The Times'unauthorized
possession. 263 After The Times ran the first story on
June 13, 1971, the government protested the publication of the information. The Times refused to
stop publication and the U.S. government sued,
seeking an injunction to bar further publica264
tion.
The U.S. government argued that the government was entitled to an injunction halting publication of the Pentagon Papers series because the
President had power to conduct foreign affairs
and protect national security. 26 5 The government
argued further that publication would do irreparable harm to the nation and its ability to conduct
foreign affairs. 2 66 The Court said in a six-to-three
vote that an order to permanently enjoin The New
York Times from publishing the series would be a
violation of the First Amendment right of freedom of the press. Although each justice wrote a
separate opinion, the majority agreed in a per
curiam opinion that in a case involving the prior
restraint of a publication, the government bears a
heavy burden to justify censorship. 26 7 The Court
concluded that under the facts in this particular
case, the government failed to show why such a
restraint should be imposed on The New York
Times. 268 The Court, however, did not settle the
question of whether the press may publish unlawfully obtained information when the press itself
was not involved in the unlawful acquisition.
By resolving the "stolen goods" question, the
Bartnicki Court added another decision to a series
of four important privacy cases that advanced
press rights over the past quarter-century. 2 69 In
the 1975 decision of Cox BroadcastingCorporationv.
Cohn, the Court held that the news media cannot
be punished or held civilly liable for publishing
private information that exists in an official court
record available to the public. 2 70 Three years
later, the Court held in Landmark v. Communica262

255

Id. at 554-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 550-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

256

Id. at 550 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).

266

252
253
254

257
Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
258
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 548. See also Goodale, supra note
196, at 3.
259
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 550-51 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
260
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 72021 (1971).
261
403 U.S. 713 (1971).

263
264
265
267

268

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at

714.
759-60.
714, 759-60.

732.
See id.
See id. at 714.
See id.

269
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
270
Cox, 420 U.S. at 491. This privacy suit was brought
against an Atlanta television station by the family of a rape
and murder victim. The station, in violation of a Georgia law
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tions, Inc. v. Virginia that a newspaper cannot be
punished for printing information about a confidential judicial inquiry because of the public interest value in such an inquiry.2 7 ' Constitutional
protection for publishing truthful information
was extended further in 1979 in Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., when the Court asserted that if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state officials "may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest.

.

.

of the highest order."272 The

fourth important ruling was handed down in 1989
in Florida Star v. B.JF, when the Court held that
when a newspaper publishes truthful but private
information that was lawfully acquired and of
public interest "punishment may be lawfully imposed.

. .

only when narrowly tailored to a state

interest of the highest order," which was an interest that was not asserted by the state in this
273

case.

Bartnicki differs from these four cases in a significant way. Each of these four cases involved publication of truthful information obtained from governmental sources, whereas Bartnicki for the first
time considered liability for invasion of privacy in
an instance where the broadcast information
came from a nongovernmental source. 274 Although Bartnicki makes a contribution to press
that prohibited the identification of sexual assault victim,
named the woman after obtaining her identity from court
records. Id. at 471-74.
271
Landmark, 435 U.S. at 838. The Virginia newspaper
identified a judge under investigation by a state panel that
reviews complaints about the conduct of judges. Id. at 831.
Chief Justice Warren Burger noted in the Landmark opinion
that conduct of public officials and the publication of the
newspaper article "lies near the core of the First Amendment." Id. at 838.
272
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979). Two West Virginia newspapers identified a 14-yearold homicide suspect after learning his name from witnesses
and law enforcement authorities. State law prohibited newspapers from identifying juvenile offenders. Id. at 99-100.
273
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541. A Florida newspaper
identified a rape victim in violation of a state law that prohibited naming sexual assault victims. A reporter lawfully obtained the woman's identity from a sheriff's department
press release. Id. at 526-27.
274
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517-18.
275
See Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). The Peavy case also
arose out of a school board dispute. A Dallas, Texas couple,
Charles and Wilma Harmon, used a police scanner in 1994
and 1995 to intercept and tape cordless-telephone conversations of a neighbor who was a Dallas Independent School
District board member who they believed was corrupt. Id. at
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rights, the Court sidestepped two overarching
questions of tremendous importance. Like its
predecessor cases discussed above, Bartnicki did
not settle the issue of whether the news media can
ever be penalized for publishing truthful information. Further, the Court again left open the corollary question of whether the press has the right to
publish truthful information if the press itself was
involved in the unlawful acquisition of the information. In other words, the Court ignored the
question of exactly what level of press involvement
may lead to culpability. In fact, the Court denied
certiorarito a separate wiretapping case that came
up for review at the same time as Bartnicki and
that posed this precise question.2 75 Historically,
the Court has stopped short of asking whether the
First Amendment protects the news media from
punishment and liability if the press itself directly
participated in unlawfully acquiring information.2

76

In Florida Star v. B.JF, Justice Thurgood

Marshall noted:
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue
whether, in cases where information has been acquired
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government
may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but
the ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised
but not definitively resolved in New York Times Co. v.
United States, and reserved in Landmark Communications.
2 77
We have no occasion to address it here.

Further casting doubt as to the weight of the
164. The Harmons offered the tapes to WFAA television reporter Robert Riggs. Riggs was advised by the station's counsel that it was lawful to accept and broadcast them. Id. The
taping of the board member, Carver Dan Peavy, continued
for several months. Id. at 165. The reporter continued accepting tapes until the station's counsel revised its opinion
and concluded that the taping was illegal under federal and
Texas wiretap statutes. Id. at 166. Three news reports were
broadcast about school board corruption involving schooldistrict employees' insurance programs that Peavy controlled. The news reports included information obtained
from the tapes that was confirmed by other sources. The reports did not include excerpts of the tapes. Id. The district
court dismissed Peavy's claims on grounds that the First
Amendment protects the use and disclosure of truthful and
lawfully obtained information. Id. at 167. However, the Fifth
Circuit reversed in part, stating that summary judgment for
the defendants was inappropriate, because the television station defendants "participated" in the interceptions. The reporter had told the Harmons that he would like copies of the
tapes that were being made and asked the couple not to edit
the tapes. Id. at 171, 194. Peavy was settled out of court after
the Supreme Court handed down the Bartnicki opinion.
276
See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 532-33, 541; Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 105; Landmark, 435 U.S. at 837.
277
See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535 n.8 (citations omitted).
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Bartnicki Court's affirmation of press freedom, the

Court repeatedly emphasized that the decision
was a very narrow one and limited to the particular facts of that case. 278 Stevens stressed that the

issue in Bartnicki asked only, "[If] the punished
publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but
from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may
the government punish the ensuing publication
of that information based on the defect in a
chain? 12

79

Echoing opinions in Florida Star and

Landmark Communications, Stevens said the Court
purposefully framed the issue narrowly in Bartnicki as, "Our refusal to construe the issue
presented more broadly is consistent with this
Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically
whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment."

2 s°
1

from recovering for the publication of the fact
that she was raped, I doubt that there remain any
'private facts' which persons may assume will not
28 4
be" the subject of news media reports.
Arguably, Bartnicki stands for the proposition
that a right of privacy may be grounds to punish
publication of the truth, but the case will most
likely "limit the maxim of 'publish and be
damned' in future privacy cases." 2

5

In noting

that the BartnickiCourt recognized a First Amendment-based right of privacy in truthful facts, First
Amendment attorney James C. Goodale, the current Communications Law chair of the Practicing
Law Institute and the former general counsel for
The New York Times in the Pentagon Paper Case,
wrote in the New York Law Journal:
It may come as a shock to many that the Supreme
Court has never before [Bartnicki] decided there is such
a right of privacy in the publishing context. While the

Breyer's concurrence reiterated and underscored

Court has recognized a right of privacy in other con-

this view.

texts such as in connection with a woman's fight to
choose and a right to be free from unreasonable
searches, the Court has never said, as far as I know,
there is a right of privacy that may penalize the publication of the truth. Writing for the majority, Justice John

281

The limited focus of the Bartnicki issue and its
narrow decision means that in another similar
case, but one with slightly different circumstances,
the decision could go the other way. The BreyerO'Connor concurrence made clear that the news
media prevailed in this instance mainly because
the radio station was not implicated in the unlawful taping itself and because the taped conversation was of unusually high public significance not simply because of the newsworthiness of the
material.

28 2

The reasoning in

the Breyer-

O'Connor concurring opinion strongly suggests
that they could easily cast their key votes with
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, forming a new majority in the future. Breyer pointedly refused to
recognize any preference for press rights of private speech.2 8 3 And it was O'Connor who cast one
of three dissenting votes in Florida Star, along with
Rehnquist and White, who wrote, "If the First
Amendment prohibits wholly private persons ...
278
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517, 528; Id. at 535-36, 541
(Breyer, J., concurring).
279
Id. at 528 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d
463, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle,J., dissenting)).
280
Bartnicki,532 U.S. at 529. See also FloridaStar, 491 U.S.
at 532-33; Landmark, 435 U.S. at 837.
See id. at 535-36, 541. (Breyer, J., concurring).
281
282
See id. at 535-36, 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
283
FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 550-51 (White, J., dissenting).
284
285
See Goodale, supra note 196.
Id.
286

on the
Paul Stevens concludes there is such a right, 286
grounds that privacy laws foster private speech.

In the final analysis, Bartnicki v. Vopper advances
press rights modestly, 28 7 while also enhancing the
288
concept of information privacy.
The rise of constitutional privacy has not taken
place in a legal vacuum. Concerns about personal
privacy, fueled in great part by unprecedented
technological advances, are abundantly evident in
statutory and regulatory actions on the federal
and state levels. Besides the more than 40 bills
considered by the 107th Congress, at least a
dozen of which deal with online privacy, 289 the
federal executive branch and individual states
have been taking action to protect the public and
preserve the right to be let alone.

The narrow focus of the Bartnicki opinion prompted
287
veteran New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda
Greenhouse to write, "While the decision favored the media
defendants, it could be read as a cautionary tale for the nation's newsrooms." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court
Roundup; Court Says Press Isn't Liablefor Use of ill-Gotten Tapes,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at A14.
288 As Goodale observed, "While media lawyers and press
barons let out a collective sigh of relief at the decision, there
may be pain for them in the future." Goodale, supra note
196.
289
See infra note 13.
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V.

CURRENT STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY TRENDS FAVOR PRIVACY
OVER OPEN GOVERNMENT

The rise of constitutionally protected information privacy carries especially troubling implications in the current national political climate,
which is increasingly marked by governmental secrecy. For example, the Bush Administration has
established a new Freedom of Information Act
policy that urges the executive branch federal
agencies to use the Act's privacy exemptions 290 to
resist disclosure of agency records. 291 In a memorandum issued on October 12, 2001, Attorney
General John Ashcroft rescinded the previous
standard set by former Attorney General Janet
Reno. The Reno FOIA policy emphasized "maximum responsible disclosure of government infor2 92
mation" unless "disclosure would be harmful."
Ashcroft replaced Reno's foreseeable-harm standard with a test that encourages withholding
based on a "sound legal basis. ' 293 Although shifts
in FOIA policy are traditional whenever a President from a different party is elected, Ashcroft's
290

See5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000); id. §552 (b)(7)(C).

291

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF IN-

FORMATION AND PRIVACY,
MEMORANDUM ISSUED,

FOIA

POST, NEW ATrORNEY GENERAL

at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/
foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm (last visited June 4, 2002)
[hereinafter DOJ MEMO]. See also Critics Say New Rules Limits
Access to Records, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A]8.
292

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM
AGENCIES

REGARDING

THE

FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND
FREEDOM

OF INFORMATION

ACT

(Summer/Fall 1993) (reprinted in FOIA UPDATE at 4-5). It is
important to place the Reno memorandum in a context that
reflects political realities and the independence of the executive branch federal agencies. In a 1997 report, the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press documented wide-

spread violations and abuses of the FOIA by agency officials
during the Clinton Administration. For example, it took The
Washington Post two years to obtain records detailing Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbot's expenses on a foreign trip,
and there were repeated denials of FOIA requests for infor-

mation pertaining to the White House's $25 million telephone system. See Mark Tapscott & Nicole Taylor, FewJournalists Use the Federal Freedom of Information Act: A Study by the
Centerfor Media and Public Policy, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
at http://www.heitage.org/research (last visited May 1,
2002). During Clinton's second term, agency delays and denials persisted, according to a study by the Heritage Foundation. See id. For example, the administration rejected a jour-
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approach represents a significant restriction even
by Republican standards, which are typically less
FOLA-friendly than those of Democratic administrations. 29 4 For comparison, during the Reagan
Administration, Attorney General William French
Smith established a "substantial legal basis" test to
withhold records. 295 Ashcroft's "sound legal basis"

test suggests an even lower hurdle than a "substan296
tial legal basis" to justify withholding records.
The new Department of Justice policy has
sparked concern among journalists, legislators
and open-government advocates who fear the administration's new direction may mark the beginning of "a new era of governmental secrecy under
the guise of protecting [personal] privacy."2 9 7 Implicit in Ashcroft's memorandum were concerns
over national security and law enforcement in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York City.
Yet, the policy's focus on privacy exemptions extends beyond matters related to national security
and law enforcement. "The mere mention of a
name in a record now...

can be used to deny a

and declassification of records than have Republican Administrations. A comparison of Executive Orders on declassification issued by Presidents Carter and Reagan reflects the
sharp differences in philosophy concerning public access between the two administrations. For example, President Carter
attempted to balance the public's right to know against national security interests by creating a presumption against
classification. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. §190, 43
Fed. Reg. 28,949 (June 28, 1978), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §401
app. 706-12 (Supp. IV 1980). Additionally, the Carter Administration's Department ofJustice encouraged a strong policy
of restricting agency use of the Freedom of Information Act.
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, JUSTICE SETS NEW
FOIA POLICY, FOIA UPDATE, Vol. II, No. 3 (June 1981), avail-

able at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia-updates/Vol_ l_3/
pagel.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002). After President Reagan took office, he restricted public access under the FOIA,
eliminated the presumption against classification and increased the duration of classifications. See Exec. Order No.
12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 2, 1982). The Reagan Executive Order remained unchanged during the Bush Administration. See also Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, Open
Government in the DigitalAge: The Legislative History of How Congress Established a Right of Public Access to Electronic Information
Held by FederalAgencies, 78 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 45,

52-53 (Spring 2001).
295

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF IN-

FORMATION

AND

PRIVACY,

ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

MEMO

ON

nalist's FOIA request for presidential guests at Camp David

FOIA, (reprinted in FOIA

on the grounds that the information "would not significantly

1981)) available at http://www.lsdo.gov/oip/foia-updates/
VolII_3/page3.htm (last visited July 9, 1981).'
296
See Critics Say New Rules Limits Access to Records, N.Y.

contribute to the public understanding of the operations or
activities of government." Id.
293
See DOJ MEMO, supra note 291.
294 Since the mid-1970s, the policies of Democratic ad-

ministrations have leaned more heavily toward disclosure

UPDATE,

Vol. II, No. 3, at 3 (June

TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A18.
297 Martin Halstuk, In Review: The Threat to Freedom of Information, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 8 (Jan./Feb. 2002).

20031

Shielding Private Lives From Prying Eyes

FOIA request on the ground that it would violate
someone's privacy,"' warned Lucy Dalglish, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. 298 Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont criticized the new FOLA policy as "contrary
to the spirit of the FOIA, [which is] intended to
give Americans answers to questions they believe
are important, not just the information the government wants them to believe."

299

The use of FOIA privacy exemptions to restrict
access to agency records was already a common
practice even before the Ashcroft memorandum,
according to the Department of Justice. 30 0 In a
30 1
2002 analysis of recent agency annual reports,
the Department of Justice reported that the general privacy exemption, Exemption 6,302 was the
298

Id.

299

Id.

300

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF IN-

FORMATION AND

PRIvACY, FOIA POST, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL

FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost3.htm (last visited

Aug. 5, 2002) [hereinafter DOJ
301
See id.

SUMMARY].

302
5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000). Exemption 6 states that
the FOIA does not allow disclosure of records pertaining to
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." Id.
303
See DOJ SUMMARY, supra note 300. See also 5 U.S.C.
§552(b) (1)-(9) (2000). The FOIA does not apply to matters
that fall under the categories of: (1) classified information
and national security; (2) internal agency personnel information; (3) information exempted by statutes; (4) trade secrets
and other confidential business information; (5) agency
memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade personal privacy; (7)
law-enforcement investigatory records; (8) reports from regulated financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical information. Exemption 7, the law enforcement exemption, contains several subsections, one of which also allows
withholding based on privacy. See 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C)
(2000). The Exemption 7 privacy subsection states that the
FOIA does not apply to matters that are "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records
or information could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id.
304
The Court ruled in favor of disclosure only once, in
its first Exemption 6 case, Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352 (1976) (upholding a FOIA request by law review editors for summaries of honor and ethics violations at the U.S.
Air Force Academy). This suit was brought by the New York
University Law Review, which sought summaries of honor and
ethics hearings conducted for United States Air Force Academy cadets who had cheated on exams. Id. at 354-55. The Air
Force argued that disclosing these records would stigmatize
the cadets for the rest of their careers. The Court ruled that
the information in the records and hearings summaries,
along with details of how the Air Force Academy handled
cheating, were of high public interest and ordered that the
records he disclosed with the names of the cadets redacted.

most commonly used of all the FOIA's nine statutory exemptions.3 0 3 Indeed, the history of FOJA
privacy disputes that have reached the Supreme
Court over the years shows that the Department
of Justice has been extremely effective in defending agency decisions to withhold records; the
Court has heard seven FOIA privacy cases since
1976, and it ruled in favor of agency decisions to
30 4
withhold records in all but one of these cases.
In another move that fosters government secrecy by the Executive Branch, President George
W. Bush has issued an executive order 305 that con30 6
flicts with the 1978 Presidential Records Act,
which had provided that presidential papers may
be made public 12 years after a President leaves
office. 30 7 Bush's order gives the sitting President,
See id. at 367-82. In the six privacy cases that followed over the
next twenty-one years, however, the Court upheld agency decisions to withhold records. See Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997) (rejecting on privacy grounds
an environmental group's FOIA request for contact information of individuals who received a Bureau of Land Management newsletter about the future of the Oregon High Desert); U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
510 U.S. 487 (1994) (rejecting on privacy grounds a Privacy
Act request by unions for home addresses of federal employees for the purposes of contacting them about union membership); U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991)
(holding that disclosure to an attorney of unredacted address
information to assist Haitian immigrants who unsuccessfully
sought political asylum in the United States was not warranted under the FOIA); Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (rejecting a
journalist's FOIA request for a FBI rap sheet of a reputed
crime figure suspected of bribing a congressman to obtain a
federal contract on grounds that releasing the information
would be an invasion of privacy because the rap sheet would
not shed any light on official agency operations or activities);
Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615
(1982) (rejecting ajournalist's FOIA request for FBI reports
requested by President Nixon, who ordered FBI background
checks on his political enemies, on grounds that information
originally compiled for law enforcement purposes does not
lose its privacy-exemption status merely because the information is reproduced in a new document that is not for law enforcement purposes); Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co.,
456 U.S. 595 (1982) (rejecting a FOIA request by The Washington Post for passport application information on two Iranian nationals who traveled under the protection of United
States passports during a period of strained relations between
Iran and the United States). These cases concerned either
the personal privacy exemption, Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C.
§552(b) (6) (2000), or the privacy subsection of the law enforcement exemption, Exemption 7, 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (7) (C)
(2000).
305
Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1,

2001).

306
Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§2201-07 (2000)
(governing the official records of Presidents and Vice Presidents created or received afterJanuary 20, 1981).
307

Id. at §2204(a).
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as well as former Presidents, the right to withhold
presidential papers3 111 Bush's executive order
takes control of presidential papers away from the
30°
National Archives of the United States. '
Under Bush's order, journalists, historians,
scholars, public citizens' groups and the general
public now must demonstrate a specific need in
order to obtain the presidential documents of
Presidents Reagan, George Bush, Sr. and William
Jefferson Clinton. 3 1 The Presidential Records
Act, which went into effect in 1981, would have
made Reagan's papers available after the current
President Bush was elected.3 11 However, those papers were not released because the current Bush
Administration undertook a review of the policy
shortly after Bush was elected. 3 12 As a result,
68,000 pages of communications between President Reagan and his advisers were withheld even
though officials at the National Archives, including the Reagan Library, wanted them made public. 31 3 The White House defended the decision,
saying that premature disclosure of confidential
decision memos could stifle candid conversations
3 14
among presidential advisers and the President.
Restrictions on access have been imposed recently on the state level as well. In a 2002 Illinois
case, the federal government thwarted a newspaper reporter's efforts to obtain the names of federal inmates in a county jail. 31 5 The reporter
sought the names of all inmates held in the DeWitt County jail under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act. 316 After she obtained the names of
the Illinois prisoners, the federal government intervened to prevent the release of the names of
federal prisoners. The government removed the
case to federal district court in Illinois,317 and the
308
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309
See id. See also Steven L. Hensen, The President's Papers
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vocating a return to open presidential records and the importance of access to presidential documents).
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2001).
311
312

TIMES,

315

district judge held that the names of federal prisoners could be withheld on privacy grounds. 318 In
Brady-Lunny v. Massey, the district court said that
providing a list of the names of inmates would
constitute "an unreasonable invasion of privacy"
because some of the inmates are "merely witnesses and detainees who have not been charged
with or convicted of crimes."'3 19 The court said releasing their names would "stigmatize these individuals" and may cause "irreparable damage to
their reputations.."320 The district court's rationale
does not, however, explain why the privacy interests of witnesses and detainees in custody justify
withholding names of federal inmates who have
been charged with and convicted of crimes.
In Florida, a state with open-records laws that
have been regarded as a model for other states, a
court of appeals last July upheld the constitutionality of a new privacy exemption for autopsy
photos. The public-record status of autopsy
photos was restricted by the Florida Legislature after the death of race-car driver Dale Earnhardt
when a Florida newspaper sought Earnhardt's autopsy records. 321 He was killed in a crash at Daytona in February 2001.322 The records were sealed
after a judge ruled that release of the photos
32 3
would violate the privacy of Earnhardt's widow.
The Earnhardt/Family Protection Act now allows
release of such materials only by a judge's or32 4
der.
In Indiana, the state legislature failed last
March in its attempt to override Governor Frank
O'Bannon's veto of an anti-access bill approved
overwhelmingly by the legislature. 325 The bill,
which had passed 71-28 in the state's House,
would have allowed legislators to decide what leg318
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Id.
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Shielding Private Lives From Prying Eyes

islative records could be made public. E-mail files
were among the records the bill would have made
confidential.3 26 The bill's supporters argued that
the proposed law was necessary to protect correspondence from constituents on personal matters.

32 7

Finally, and remarkably, in 2002, the National
Zoo in Washington, D.C., denied The Washington
Post access to the medical records of a giraffe that
had died, on the grounds that disclosure would
violate the dead animal's privacy rights. 3 28 Zoo Director Lucy Spelman told The Post that "privacy
rules that apply to human medical records, and
the physician-patient relationship, do not apply in
precisely the same way to animal medicine at a
public institution like the National Zoo. But we
3 29
believe they do in principle."
VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The tension between individual privacy and
public/press access to government-controlled information and activities represents a conflict between important competing values that serve democracy and help structure public discourse. Privacy laws protect individual interests and the right
to be let alone. Privacy also is necessary to form
intimate relationships and make decisions regarding deeply personal matters. The ability to conceal aspects of one's identity is necessary for personal freedom and is an integral part of the political process. On the other hand, access laws protect social interests and advance the democratic
principle of holding accountable those who govern us. The news media sometime invade personal privacy when they seek access to government records containing information on private
326
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332 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); HanIon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Lauro v. City of New York,
39 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). It is of historical interest
that the Fourth Amendment has roots in disputes between
NAL OF NEWS AND DEVELOPMENTS,

individuals or when they report on the performance of governmental services such as law enforcement agencies. Such newsgathering practices,
however, can serve the right to know by advancing
the general public's need for government information for the purpose of making informed decisions concerning self-rule.
The rise of constitutional privacy has increased
this tension. Constitutional privacy has taken several forms, deriving mainly from the rationale
that zones of privacy, implicit in the First, Third,
Fourth and Ninth Amendments, protect individuals from governmental intrusion. 330 Early court
opinions that first recognized a right to privacy
held that an individual has a right to be free of
governmental interference when it comes to
those autonomous decisions that enable people to
have control over their lives and private behavior.3 31 Those same decisions later provided the
foundation for a series of court holdings that prohibited certain newsgathering practices on the
theory that law enforcement agencies violated
Fourth Amendment privacy interests. 332 In these
Fourth Amendment privacy decisions, which concerned governmental cooperation with journalists
gathering information for news stories, courts
held that it was unconstitutional for law enforcement authorities to permit journalists to have access to a private residence133 or to private property334 during the execution of a warrant and to
arrange a "perp walk" so journalists could film a
3 35
criminal suspect for a news program.
A second stream of constitutional privacy, information privacy, emerged in a clash with public
and press interests in access to government-held
information. 336 In a Sixth Circuit decision, a federal court of appeals held that information prithe press and the Crown, first in England and later in the
Colonies. See Stanford v. Texas 379 U.S. 476 (1965) ("[W]hile
the Fourth Amendment was most immediately the product of
contemporary revulsion against a regime of writs of assistance, its roots go far deeper. Its adoption in the Constitution
of this new Nation reflected the culmination in England a
few years earlier of a struggle against oppression which had
endured for centuries .... What is significant to note is that
this history is largely a history of conflict between the Crown

and the press." Id. at 482. See also RODNEY A.
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SocIETv 274 (1992).

SMOLLA, FREE

See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605-06.
Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810.
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Cir. 1998).
333
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vacy overrode the Ohio Public Records Act that
had allowed public access to police personnel-file
information. 337 Information privacy was first rec-

ognized

two decades earlier by the

Whalen

Court, 338 and although some leading legal experts

agree that Whalen marks the first time the Court
recognized information privacy, 339 this area of
constitutional privacy has yet to develop with
3
clearly defined boundaries.

40

Finally, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court recognized for the first time a constitutional right of
privacy concerning disclosure of private informa34 1
tion obtained from a nongovernmental source.

Arguably, Bartnicki recognizes constitutional protection for "truthful private facts." 342 Bartnicki dif-

fers notably from the other constitutional privacy
cases examined in this analysis because it does not
concern state action, but focuses instead on thirdparty incursions - the privacy interest being the
statutory privacy advanced by the wiretap laws and
violated by the news media. The Bartnicki Court
acknowledged that this privacy interest qualifies
for constitutional protection. However, the majority also ruled that under the facts in this particular
case, First Amendment protections must prevail.
Bartnicki resonates with information privacy in
that the interest the Court was asked to protect
was essentially the right of the individual to avoid
disclosure about personal information. Implicit
throughout the Court's reasoning is the core idea
that there is an important state interest in a law
that shields personal information about an individual from disclosure. This concept is analogous
to the information privacy interest considered in
337
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338
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Kallstrom - the right of the individual to control
information about oneself. Bartnicki does not uncontrovertibly establish a new constitutional right
for the protection of private facts. As the
O'Connor-Breyer concurrence makes clear, the
34 3
decision easily could have gone the other way.
Bartnicki's implications for constitutionally protected private facts privacy or information privacy,
therefore, remains elusive. Still, Bartnicki contributes to the emergence of some form of constitutional protection for private information, despite
its uncertain and protracted development.
The problem posed by the rise of constitutionally protected privacy is that when constitutional
privacy is presented as a bar to access of government-controlled operations or records, judicial reflection to consider the benefits of public and
press access is severely constrained, if not eliminated. In a conflict between privacy and access interests, the overarching question should not be
whether there has been an invasion of privacy,
but, rather, whether there has been an unwarranted invasion of privacy. The trumping power of
constitutional privacy can undercut judicial power
to make this important distinction. In these times,
with concerns about privacy reaching unprecedented levels as current statutory and regulatory
trends demonstrate, it becomes apparent how the
uniquely powerful force of constitutional privacy
can dangerously threaten a crucial balance which,
as Professor Westin warned in the years before
privacy law mushroomed, must be maintained to
preserve democracy and keep government responsible.
velopment of information privacy in cases up to and including Whalen and Nixon, concluded that "[t]aken together,
these cases suggest there is as yet no firm constitutional right
to informational privacy." Id. at 587.
341
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342
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343 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).

